

XV.—ΕΘΟΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΗ ΦΤΣΙΣ

A NEW FRAGMENT OF DEMOCRITUS?

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An analysis of some sections of the *Misopogon* and the two anti-Cynic orations of the emperor Julian helps to identify a new fragment of Democritus and to show the range of his ideas in which this fragment had its origin. The discussion of the relevant sections of these three discourses also discloses the relations between Neo-Platonist and Cynic philosophy as well as the influence which, in the opinion of those Neo-Platonic circles to which the emperor Julian belonged, Democritus exerted on Cynic philosophers.

I

The student of the history of ancient literature knows that many sentences or *γνώμαι* which originated with particular authors became anonymous in the course of the centuries. As *ἀδόξοτα* they were taken into collections of proverbs or florilegia. From sources of this type they passed under the guise of proverbial expressions or winged words, into the works of authors of later antiquity and were taken over from these sources into the literature of modern nations. Writers of essays and philosophical treatises are fond of quoting those ancient sentences, either exactly or with slight alterations, or of weaving them into the text of their own discussion, even without knowing who originally coined them. When modern scholars attempt to identify the ancient authors of sentences of this kind by examining and comparing the available material, only seldom are they successful. In most instances they must content themselves with establishing that the sentence with which they are dealing appears first in a certain century or within a particular circle of men or range of ideas.

The individual case which I am going to discuss, however, seems to be different. It will not be necessary to limit ourselves to saying that the *γνώμη* which forms the title of this article belongs to a certain circle; it will, on the contrary, be possible not only to connect it with one particular author but also to regain a new fragment of this author. Should this attempt be successful and should the conclusions which must be drawn from the available material prove convincing, such a result would compensate for the intricate in-

vestigation, since every fragment of early Greek literature, however small it be, is a valuable acquisition; it throws new light upon the ideas of an ancient thinker and enables us to understand better the contents of one of his works which, as a whole, is lost for ever.

The sentence in question is referred to by Cicero in *De Finibus* 5.74¹: *deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici*. Here Cicero does not make it clear whether he took this sentence from any source; he seems rather to introduce it as if he were himself its original author. It is worth mentioning that, according to Cicero, second nature is only a product of habit, not identical with it. The next² stage is represented by Macrobius *Sat.* 7.9.7: *consuetudo quam secundam naturam pronuntiavit usus*. The differences between the two forms are evident. Macrobius goes much farther than Cicero, inasmuch as he, or rather his source, identifies habit and second nature and refers to *usus* as the authority for this identification. Does the term *usus* mean that Macrobius or his source considered the sentence a proverb or something like that? St. Augustine is very fond of this sentence and quotes it several times in different ways, each of which is very instructive. In his treatise *Contra Iulianum* 4.103 (45.1398 Migne) he says: *quae (sc. consuetudo) non frustra dicta est a quibusdam secunda natura*. The plural *quibusdam* does not imply that St. Augustine refers to more than one author. This is clear from the terminology adopted by grammarians and writers of scholia, for in most of the cases in which they say *τινὲς λέγουσιν* they refer to one source which they do not quote by name. Two other references in St. Augustine must be considered parallel, inasmuch as he states that this definition of habit was given by some "scholars" whom he is either unable or unwilling to characterize more specifically. Both passages are found in the same treatise as the first one *Contra Iulianum*; they are 1.105 (45.1119 M.): *secunda natura, sic enim a doctis appellari consuetudinem*, and 1.69 (45.1091 M.): *quae (sc. consuetudo) ab eruditis etiam saeculi dici solet secunda natura*. In this survey another passage of St. Augustine must be considered separately. Although he does not refer to any author in this passage, he adds to *natura* a new attribute, which requires our attention because it sounds like a translation of a Greek equivalent. This passage of

¹ The material is collected by Otto, *Sprichwörter der Römer* 90f.; the references given by him, however, are far from being complete.

² "Next" not in chronological but in genetical sense.

St. Augustine is found in *De Musica* 6.7.19 (32.1173 M.). It reads as follows: *consuetudo quae secunda et quasi affabricata natura est*. It is interesting and perhaps not fortuitous that the restrictive adverb *quasi*, which is used by Cicero (see above p. 215), appears also in this passage of St. Augustine. He adds, however, a second epithet which is almost ³ a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον, *affabricata*. Did he add it on his own initiative, or did he follow a Greek model? The second alternative seems more plausible. The Greek equivalent to *affabricata* is ἐπικτήτος. This adjective is used by Ionic and Attic authors. For instance, Herodotus, in 2.5 (cf. 10) calls Egypt ἐπικτήτός τε γῆ καὶ δῶρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ, "an acquired country and gift of the river." Plato, in *Phaedrus* 237d, speaks of ἐπικτήτος δόξα and contrasts it with ἔμφυτος ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, and in *Republic* 10.618d he distinguishes between πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων. Moreover, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in *Antiquitates Romanae* 3.70, distinguishes between ἔμφυτος and ἐπικτήτος μαντεία. Thus it becomes evident that St. Augustine used a *contradictio in adiecto* when he spoke of *affabricata natura*. He endeavored, however, to weaken this *contradictio in adiecto* which he felt by adding *quasi*. In spite of this seeming contradiction we have two very close parallels to this passage which are not mentioned by Otto (*l.c.*), although they are striking. Galen, in *Περὶ μυνῶν κινήσεως* 4.452 K., says εἵκει δ' εἰς ταῦτὸ συμβαίνειν πανταχῇ τὸ μὲν ἔθος τῇ φύσει, καὶ καλῶς εἴρηται φύσις ἐπικτήτος. We must leave it undecided what author Galen is referring to in εἴρηται. In another passage, however, he refers to τοὺς παλαιούς as the source of this sentence and says (*Περὶ κράσεων*, p. 61, 27 sqq. in G. Helmreich's edition in the *Bibl. Teubn.*): εἴρηται γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιστα παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν, ὡς ἐπικτήτοι φύσεις εἰσὶ τὰ ἔθη. Unfortunately we are unable to decide whether Galen followed an earlier physician ⁴ or a philosopher or both together.

Nevertheless it is not necessary to drop the attempt to go back to the origin of this sentence. We have at our disposal another parallel to which no one has paid any attention. This parallel, which is so strange that it is worth examining very carefully, is offered by a passage of the treatise *Misopogon* of the emperor Julian. This treatise was directed by the emperor against the people of

³ Cf. *TLL* 1.1172.

⁴ The *Corpus Hippocraticum* does not furnish any usable parallel.

Antioch and was written in 363 A.D.⁵ before the emperor engaged in the war with the Parthians in which he was mortally wounded. On page 351ff. (452, 21ff. Hertlein) Julian gives a long survey of the training (*διδαχή*) which he received from his teacher, the eunuch Mardonius, and highly praises the man and his pedagogical maxims and method, although he seemingly criticizes him for having trained him in a manner different from that which is favored by the super-cultivated people of Antioch. But while he pretends to agree with the people of this city who do not like the emperor or his habits, he reproaches them ironically and bitterly. On page 353 A (455, 14 H.) he introduces as interlocutor one of the residents of Antioch who wonders if it might be possible for the emperor to leave off his bad habits (*ἀποθέσθαι*), to learn better ways (*μεταμαθεῖν*), and to transform his boorish character (*εἴ τι πρότερον ἡμῖν ἄγροικον ἦθος ἐνετράφη*). To this fictitious question Julian replies: No, that is impossible.⁶ Ἔθος, φασί, δευτέρῃ φύσει. Here we must stop for the moment. The following sentence, which is no less important, will be examined below. Habit, they say, is second nature. This is the only passage in Greek literature where the word used is not *ἐπικτητος* but *δευτερος*, that is, the exact equivalent to the Latin *altera* or *secunda* mentioned above. The compilers of the Liddell-Scott-Jones lexicon, who quote the passage of Julian s.v. *φύσει* (II 1964), were induced—or seduced—by the parenthetical *φασί* to call the sentence a proverb. Were they right? Yes and no. Although I am far from denying the possibility that this sentence was to be read anonymously in some florilegium or collection of proverbs, for reasons which will become evident below it is unlikely that Julian consulted a source of this kind; it is more probable that he refers to a particular author whose works he knew well. Perhaps we may still be able to identify this author. In making the attempt we must emphasize the fact that Julian quotes the sentence in the Ionic dialect.⁷ It is, however, noteworthy that one manuscript,

⁵ See Augusto Rostagni, *Giuliano L'Apostata. Saggio critico con le operette politiche e satiriche tradotte e commentate* (Torino, 1920) 248.2; 262f., 4; 283.2.

⁶ These words are not in the Greek original; it is, however, appropriate to insert them in the paraphrase which I have given above.

⁷ Joh. Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg, 1909), 146, who quotes this passage, overlooks the whole problem. The only thing he has to say is: "In der Tat, dies ist eine der besten Stellen des Misopogon; die Ironie: verzeiht mir, daß ich nicht ein solcher Weichling, wie ihr seid, ich kann wirklich nichts dafür, man hat mich leider so erzogen, und: 'jung gewohnt, alt getan' verdient alle Anerkennung, aber sie scheint doch alte Kunst zu sein." The reference to Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.105, however, is useful: *insuevit* (~ ἦθος ἐνετράφη) *pater optimus hoc me.*

the *Marcianus graecus* 251 (Mb in Hertlein's edition), which seems to belong to the 15th century,⁸ replaces the Ionic form *δευτέρῃ* by the Attic one which the unthinking reader might expect to be used. Let us take, however, the valuable hint which is given by the Ionic form, for its appearance not only paves the way to an investigation of his possible source but also narrows the circle of those authors among whom we must carry on our search.

Let us remember that Julian discusses not only the importance of habit (*ἔθος*), which he calls second nature (*δευτέρῃ φύσει*), but reviews also his own training (*διδασχῇ*).⁹ Among the Greek philosophers there is one and only one who is fond of connecting these terms in his ethical discussions, Democritus.¹⁰ Among those fragments of Democritus which cannot be referred to a particular treatise, we meet a striking parallel. Fragment 33 D(iels)-K(ranz) = 187 N(atorp)¹¹ reads as follows: ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδασχῇ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδασχῇ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φ υ σ ι ο π ο ι ε ῖ. When H. Diels published the third edition of the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers in 1912, he translated the last colon in a very significant manner, as follows: "Aber durch diese Umformung schafft sie eine *zweite* Natur." Thus he introduced in his translation, quite involuntarily I think, just what we read in Julian's treatise. Diels had, however, the attribute "*zweite*," which has no equivalent in the Greek text, printed in italics to indicate an addition having practically the value of an interpretation. W. Kranz, the editor of the fifth edition of the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers, eliminated the addition and translated " schafft sie Natur." H. Langerbeck, in the book mentioned above, does not give a translation but contents himself with a paraphrase¹² as follows (*loc. cit.* p. 56): "und damit macht sie (die Belehrung) ihn (den Menschen) zu einer ganz anderen Natur."¹³

⁸ See Hertlein's Praefatio p. v: "saeculi circiter xv."

⁹ Although Julian does not here use the noun *διδασχῇ*, we are free to make use of it, since the emperor speaks of *διδάσκαλος* and *διδάσκειν* in this section of his treatise again and again.

¹⁰ Cf. H. Langerbeck, ΔΟΞΙΣ ΕΠΙΠΤΣΜΙΗ. *Neue Philologische Untersuchungen* 10 (Berlin, 1935), 68: "Neben der *διδασχῇ*, der Belehrung, ist von besonderer Wichtigkeit für die Gestaltung der *φύσις* die Gewöhnung."

¹¹ The sources of this fragment are Clem. *Strom.* 4.151 (2.314,12 Stählin) and Stob. 2.31,65 (2.231,1 Wachsmuth).

¹² He does so according to his rule "So habe ich im allgemeinen die freie Paraphrase der Uebersetzung vorgezogen," see page 1 of his book.

¹³ P. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokritos* (Marburg, 1893) 118, discusses the fragment briefly without, however, translating it, nor does he give a paraphrase. O.

Although this fragment of Democritus furnishes the best possible parallel with the Ionic sentence which is quoted by Julian, it does not provide sufficient and definite proof that the sentence ἔθος δευτέρῃ φύσει was coined by Democritus too. We have, therefore, before claiming it for Democritus, to look for further confirmation. Kranz is quite right in quoting in a note to fragment 33 two hexameters of the poet (or, perhaps better, sophist) Evenus (fr. 9 Diehl),¹⁴ which read as follows: *φημί πολυχρονίην μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ | ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι*. The term *μελέτη* does not occur in Democritus' fragments, but we can take it for granted that the words *μελέτη τελευτῶσα φύσις* sound like a variation of ἔθος δευτέρῃ φύσει. Plato in *Phaedo* 82b: *πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν . . . ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γιγνομένην ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας*, shows how close both terms are—if there is any need of proof at all. With these two verses of Evenus, who evidently depends on Democritus, we must class a tetrameter of Epicharmus (fr. 33 Diels = 284 Kaibel), the source of which is Stobaeus 3.29.54: *ἀ δὲ μελέτα φύσιος ἀγαθῆς πλέονα δωρεῖται, φίλοι (φίλοις Stob., φίλε Wil.)*; a fragment of Critias (9 Diehl = Stob. 3.29.11) *ἐκ μελέτης πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί*; and a trimeter which is quoted by Stob. 2.31.10 (2.202.3 W.) and 2.7.11^m (2.107.18 W.) as a "proverb": *μελέτη χρονισθεῖς' εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται*. August Nauck took this "proverb" into his collection of fragments of the tragic poets and placed it among the *ἀδόξοτα*.¹⁵ I should not be greatly surprised if scholars would one day succeed in proving that the author of this trimeter is either Critias, as in the case of the fragment quoted above, or Euripides, and that it was taken out of one of the general *ρήσεις*, containing reflections on human nature and the influence of *φύσις* and *νόμος* upon it, of which Euripides is so fond. The words *εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται* are nothing but a paraphrase of *γίγνεται 'δευτέρῃ φύσει'*. Now we have ἔθος and δευτέρῃ φύσει on the one hand and μελέτη, which is supposed to be of greater importance for human beings than nature, and *εἰς φύσιν καθίστασθαι* on the other hand. All the different variations which are based upon the same sentence carry us back to another fragment of Democritus. Democritus was just the man to praise the high value of exercise (*ἄσκησις*) for creating a good

Thimme, *Φύσις, τρόπος, ἦθος* (Diss. Gött., 1935) 73 says: "Die Erziehung gibt dem Menschen einen anderen Lebensrhythmus, der das Leben so bestimmt, daß gleichsam eine neue Natur entsteht."

¹⁴ Cf. W. Aly, *Ph Suppl.* 21.53ff. and R. Philippson, *H* 59 (1924) 382.

¹⁵ Fr. 516 (second edition).

nature and to emphasize the opinion that exercise is more important in this respect than original nature. In fragment 242 D.-K. (= 193 N.) Democritus¹⁶ says: *πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος*.¹⁷ "Ἀσκησις, μελέτη, ἔθος, and ξυνήθεια¹⁸ are almost synonymous, and from the fragments we understand that Democritus felt free to use each of them as equivalent to the others.

Now, after the examination of all these different fragments, between which there are very close relations, we are prepared to deal with a passage of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* which no one has connected with Democritus, unless something has escaped my attention. In so doing we cannot avoid a certain amount of digression, which, however, will open up a better approach to the solution of the problem with which we are dealing.

About sixty-five years ago Rudolf Hirzel published a paper on Democritus in *Hermes* 14 (1879) 354ff. The main object of his discussion was to reconstruct Democritus' treatise *Περὶ εὐθυμίας* with the help of Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* and Plutarch's *Περὶ εὐθυμίας*. Hirzel's arguments did not prove entirely convincing; he went much too far and was too confident about the possibility of reaching definite conclusions. He was also wrong when he tried to identify Democritus' treatise *Περὶ εὐθυμίας* with the *Ῥποθήκαι* of the same author. Hirzel was criticized by Paul Friedländer, who published a very valuable paper on *Ῥποθήκαι* in *Hermes* 48 (1913) 558ff.¹⁹ One of the secondary results reached by Hirzel, however, seems to me still to deserve full attention. Hirzel (*loc. cit.* 377)

¹⁶ Stob. 3.29.66.

¹⁷ Cf. Democ. fr. 241 D.-K. (= 132 N.) in Stob. 3.29.64 *πόνος συνεχὴς ἐλαφρότερος ἑαυτοῦ συννηθεῖ γίνεσθαι*.

¹⁸ When Natorp, *l.c.* 118, discussed fr. 187 (= 33 D.-K.) (see above p. 218) he laid emphasis upon the close relations between the pedagogical theories of Democritus and Protagoras. Natorp is quite right. It is, however, better not to compare fr. 33 D.-K. with Protagoras, because Democritus here calls nature and discipline similar, but fr. 242 with Prot. fr. 3 D.-K. where Protagoras says that *φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέχεται*. Since we know that the activities of the two fellow countrymen Democritus and Protagoras were not carried on without reciprocal comment (see also R. Philippon, *H* 59 [1924] 381), it can scarcely be denied, when Protagoras considers *φύσις* and *ἀσκησις* to be of equal value for the training of a man, that either he refers to Democritus and modifies his pedagogical point of view or vice versa. I am afraid that the question of priority cannot be decided in this case. From Plu. *Adv. Colot.* 4.1109 A and Sextus *math.* 9.56 we learn that Democritus wrote against Protagoras. For the fragments of Democritus and Protagoras, cf. Thimme, *loc. cit.*, 72ff.

¹⁹ In the third chapter of this paper (p. 603ff.) Friedländer discusses the problem of the *Ῥποθήκαι* of Democritus and makes it clear why it is impossible to follow Hirzel. We must distinguish sharply between *Περὶ εὐθυμίας* and the *Ῥποθήκαι*.

pointed out that the anonymous philosopher to whom Plutarch (Περὶ εὐθ. 4 [466 F]) refers must be Democritus. Plutarch says: οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τοῖς ἐλομένοις τὸν ἄριστον βίον ἡδὺν, ὥς τις εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἅμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ ἄριστον καὶ ἡδιστον. Hirzel, who is convinced that *τις* in Plutarch means Democritus, finds some confirmation in Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* 10 and in Democritus' fragment 241 D.-K. (132 N.), which I have discussed above. I am afraid that we must leave it undecided whether Plutarch is arguing against Democritus or against another more recent philosopher who was well acquainted with the stress which Democritus laid upon the importance of *ξυνήθεια* for human life and who connected fundamental ideas of Democritus with his own more hedonistic outlook upon the world. Furthermore, if it was Democritus, we cannot decide definitely whether he discussed the pre-eminent role of habit in Περὶ εὐθυμίας or in the Ὑποθήκαι²⁰ or in both works. The possibility that he dealt with the same subject in different books cannot be denied. Much more important for my discussion, however, is another point. On the same page (377) of his paper Hirzel says in a note that it must be possible to find the same thought also in works of other authors and refers to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* A 10.1369b 16f.: ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν. It is true that this sentence of Aristotle resembles very much Democritus fragment 241 (see above p. 220, n. 17). On the other hand it remains no less true that unequivocal traces of Democritus' ethical treatises in Aristotle are very scarce. Natorp was not wrong when he pointed out²¹ that it is hazardous although not quite impossible to claim one of the ethical treatises of Democritus as the model or source for any passage of Aristotle.²² For this reason I would not venture to base any relationship between Aristotle and Democritus on this passage unless we had another important confirmation which we can scarcely set aside.

²⁰ See page 220, note 19.

²¹ *Ethika des Demokritos* 177ff.

²² H. Laue, "Die Ethik des Demokritos," *Sokrates* 11 (1923/4) 61f. limits himself to making the following general statement: "Die Gedanken, wie sie bei Demokrit vorliegen, haben einen gewaltigen Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophie ausgeübt. Von hier ziehen sich Verbindungslinien hinüber zu den Kyrenaikern, zu Stoa und Epikur; die Ethik des Sokrates, Platos, ja selbst des Aristoteles wird vorbereitet durch die des Demokrit; uralte Probleme, der Gegensatz νόμος—φύσις, die Lehre von der Ataraxie, der Autarkie, dem Reichtum der Natur—hier ist alles schon in den Elementen vorhanden."

Only a few lines after this passage of Aristotle, to which Hirzel called attention when he discussed the influence which Democritus exercised upon more recent philosophers, we read the following sentence (A 11.1370 a 6): καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει. These words of Aristotle sound like a combination of the beginning of Democritus fragment 33 D.-K. (187 N.), ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιον ἐστι, and the sentence which we find in Julian, ἔθος δευτέρῃ φύσις, which I have claimed for Democritus for the reasons mentioned above.²³ We must therefore ask if it is only coincidental that two passages of Aristotle which are found one almost immediately after the other carry us back to Democritus. I think that now the burden of proving that it is nothing but a coincidence rests with the sceptical unbeliever. I am also convinced that Democritus placed the two sentences close together in one of his ethical works, which is supposed to have been the *Ῥποθήκαι*. R. Philippson ("Demokrits Sittensprüche," *Hermes* 59 [1924] 378; cf. 382f.) pointed out that not only fragment 33 D.-K. but also fragments 31 and 32 were taken from the *Ῥποθήκαι* by Clement of Alexandria. As it has become evident that the sentence ἔθος δευτέρῃ φύσις cannot be separated from 33, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that the new fragment also must be claimed for the *Ῥποθήκαι*.

A renewed examination of the passage in Julian, with which I started my investigation, will now furnish further confirmation of my point of view and will enable us to draw an important conclusion for Democritus.

²³ It is an appreciable analogy and should therefore not be overlooked that Julian *Or.* 6.187 D. (p. 243, 9 H.) quotes the fragment of Heraclitus 40 D.-K. (= 16 Byw.), πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει, in quite the same manner as the fragment which I have claimed for Democritus. He does not give any name of author and inserts *φασί* after πολυμαθία γάρ. In view of the Ionic form δευτέρῃ it is noteworthy that πολυμαθὴ does not appear (or no longer appears?) in the mss. of Julian if Hertlein's apparatus criticus is trustworthy. We cannot decide which form was used by Julian. There is another case in Julian which is no less noteworthy. In his 81st letter (p. 99.7 Bidez-Cumont) he quotes Soph. *OT* 614 without giving the name of the author, merely contenting himself with adding ὡς παρὰ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἔγνωμεν. Quotations from ancient authors in the works of writers of later antiquity, which are introduced by λέγουσι, λέγεται, φασί, φησί τις, etc., have been discussed by A. Brinkmann, *RhM* 64 (1909) 638 and E. Nachmanson, "Zum Nachleben der Aphorismen," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin* 3.4 (1933) 94.3, and "Der griechische Buchtitel," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift* 47 (1941) 19.35.1. The emperor Marcus quotes from or refers to Democritus fr. 3 D.-K. (= 163 N.): τὸν εἰθνυμείσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν, in *Eis ἐαυτὸν* 4.24, ὀλίγα πρήσσε, φησὶ ν, εἰ μέλλεις εὐθυμήσειν.

I have already said ²⁴ that the fictitious interlocutor who represents the people of Antioch asks Julian: εἴτα οὐκ ἐξεστὶν ἀποθέσθαι ²⁵ καὶ μεταμαθεῖν, εἴ τι πρότερον ἡμῖν ἀγροικον ἦθος ἐνετράφη, and that Julian replies: ἔθος, φασί, δευτέρῃ φύσει. Julian has a knowledge of Greek language in general and of philosophical terminology in particular that is too accurate to allow him to fall a victim to a confusion, even although ἦθος may imply the idea of peculiarity which is based upon habit (ξυνήθεια).²⁶ It is, however, unlikely that Julian indulged in etymological speculations. We must therefore rather look for another explanation. The words ἦθος ἐνετράφη recall one of the most famous sentences of Heraclitus, I mean the sentence which we read in fragment 119 D.-K. (121 Byw.): ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. It seems a plausible hypothesis that the two words ἦθος ἐνετράφη in their original shape also do not belong to Julian but to Democritus, and that Democritus referred to Heraclitus when he coined them in order to place against Heraclitus' ἦθος his own favorite idea of ἔθος and its great importance for human nature. In other words, Democritus wished to modify Heraclitus' point of view. Perhaps he was aware that he was emphasizing the view held by Empedocles, B 110.5 D.-K.: αὐτὰ αὖξει ταῦτ' εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ.²⁷ We need not content ourselves with this simple assertion, we can actually prove it. It is a well known fact that Democritus was fond of puns of this kind. Th. Birt, who contributed a chapter on the style of Democritus' ethical sentences to Natorp's book mentioned above, has proved (p. 184ff.) that puns of this type are typical of Democritus' style. This is, however, of minor importance because we have a much more relevant observation at our disposal. Julian goes on: φύσει μάχεσθαι δ' ἔργον, "and it is extremely difficult (παγχάλεπον) to leave off habits (μελέτην) of thirty years." It is by no means fortuitous that the beginning of Julian's sentence strikingly resembles another fragment of Democritus. This fragment (236 D.-K. = 88 N. from Stob. III 20.56) reads as follows: θυμῷ ²⁸ μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλε-

²⁴ See page 217.

²⁵ Cf. R. Asmus, *Ph* 77 (1921), 120, note 273.

²⁶ Cf. Boisacq s.v. ἔθος and O. Thimme, *loc. cit.*, 10.

²⁷ Cf. Thimme, *loc. cit.* 48: "ἦθος gibt hier die Gesamtaussage über das menschliche Sein. . . . Das Moment der Gewöhnung, das zu der inneren Haltung führt, ist nicht immer so stark wie bei Empedokles betont. Heraklit hat es garnicht mehr."

²⁸ Natorp, *loc. cit.* 108, was not quite correct in translating θυμός by *Zorn* (wrath); much better and less superficial is the *Herz* (heart) of Diels-Kranz.

πόν,²⁹ ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατεῖν εὐλογίστου. The intention of this fragment of Democritus cannot be understood unless we remember that Democritus, when he coined the sentence, did not wish to imitate but to modify³⁰ Heraclitus' fragment 85 D.-K. (105 Byw.): θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅτι γὰρ ἂν θέλῃ, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται. This case is not exceptional in Democritus. On the contrary, Natorp pointed out (*loc. cit.* 108.34 and 114.38) that there are several cases in which Democritus followed the same method, and that we are unable to understand the fragments completely unless we compare them with their Heraclitean models, which Democritus changed following his own philosophical outlook upon the world. There is no need to repeat the examples discussed by Natorp.³¹

Thus it has become evident that Julian refers more than once to Democritus in this passage. Our interpretation of Julian's words enables us to identify a new fragment of Democritus which is in full harmony with one of Democritus' fundamental ethical tenets as understood from his other fragments discussed above. We also realize more clearly that Democritus developed several of his favorite ideas by means of intense and continuous discussion with Heraclitus, whose points of view he modified. I think that we shall not be wrong in calling this method a subtle kind of creative *μίμησις*.

Last of all, if we have succeeded in claiming the famous sentence ἔθος δευτέρῃ φύσει for Democritus, it is no longer surprising that it exercised so great an influence upon other Greek and Latin authors. Nor is it very strange that it became anonymous. Because it was so famous it became a winged word³² and was taken over by authors

²⁹ For the sake of amplification Julian changed his Democritean model, dividing it into two cola. As he wished to use the Democritean adjective χαλεπόν in the second colon he needed another predicate for the first colon and replaced χαλεπόν by ἔργον, which occurs in Julian also in another passage (7.227 B: ἡ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἦν εἰπεῖν μυθῶριόν τι τοιοῦτον); in the second colon he did not content himself with using the simple adjective χαλεπόν, like Democritus, but strengthened it with the prefix παγ-. I do not know whether R. Asmus, *Ph* 76 (1920) 272, note 36 is right in considering παγχάλεπον a reminiscence of Pseudo-Plat. *Alc. I* 129a.

³⁰ Cf. Natorp, *loc. cit.* 108 and Kranz's note.

³¹ Cf. also Hirzel, *loc. cit.* 359.3 and Friedländer, *loc. cit.* 609: "Wohl aber dürfen wir mit den demokriteischen Gnomen die aphoristisch geprägten Kernsätze des Heraklit formell auf dieselbe Stufe stellen (wie denn auch von dort Fäden zu Demokrit führen)."—I content myself with recalling that Heracl. fr. 40 D.-K. (= 16 Byw.), which is quoted by Julian (see page 222, note 23) is referred to and modified by Democritus frgs. 64.65 (= Democritus frgs. 29.30).

³² Although there is scarcely need of citing any examples, one passage of Julian himself is so characteristic that it is worth mentioning. The emperor begins his sixth

of collections of proverbs and florilegia. There are many analogous cases in the literatures of all nations, ancient as well as modern, in which so-called winged words have become ἀδέσποτα.

II

It is commonly taken for granted, and seems to be the generally accepted theory today, that Julian did not read Empedocles and Heraclitus at first hand but knew them only through an intermediary.³³ Since, except for the two quotations from a third pre-Socratic philosopher, Democritus, discussed in the first chapter of this paper, no other traces which carry us back to Democritus have been found in the works of the emperor, the question arises whether Julian had any *direct* knowledge of the ethical works of Democritus. The fact that Julian adds *φασί* to the quotations from both Heraclitus³⁴ and Democritus does not allow us to draw conclusions of any kind; this is the more apparent since he uses the same word *φασί* in referring to the well-known fact that Egypt is regularly inundated by the Nile.³⁵ Therefore, since general reflections are not profitable, we must now examine the whole section of the *Misopogon* which contains the two quotations from Democritus from a different point of view.

I have already said that Julian gives the people of Antioch a full account of the philosophical training which he received as a student. This education exerted a decisive influence upon his whole outlook on life, which he considered to be true and pure Cynicism. From two orations, 6 and 7, we learn that Julian was a vehement adversary of those philosophers who pretended that they were genuine Cynics and behaved accordingly. According to Julian, however, the sole result of their quackery was to discredit genuine Cynicism and to slander the memory of the great founders of the Cynic sect. It is not within the scope of my discussion to ask whether and how far Julian was right in inveighing against those people whom he called uncultivated (ἀπαιδευτους). My use of the anti-Cynic discourses of Julian has another purpose. It will

oration *Εἰς τοὺς ἀπαιδευτοὺς κίνυας* with the following words: "Ἄνω ποταμῶν, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τῆς παροιμίας. This "proverb" was taken from Eur. *Med.* 410: ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί.

³³ See Joh. Geffcken, *Kaiser Julianus*, pp. 156 and 157; in the case of Empedocles a Neo-Platonic treatise is supposed to be Julian's source.

³⁴ See p. 222, n. 23.

³⁵ Or. 1.27 B (p. 33, 15 H.), cf. Geffcken, *loc. cit.* 132.

appear that they enable us to gain better evidence about Julian's method of working and writing.

In 1917 the German scholar Rudolf Asmus, one of the most notable experts in the field with which we deal, published a paper on the two orations *Eis τοὺς ἀπαιδευτοὺς κύνας* (6) and *Πρὸς Ἡράκλειον Κυνικόν* (7).³⁶ The scope of this paper was to prove that the main source of Julian was the commentary on the Platonic or rather pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Alcibiades I*³⁷ by the Neo-Platonic philosopher Iamblichus. In spite of Asmus' attempt the reconstruction of Iamblichus' commentary is still hypothetical, and also several details were modified and some of his assertions were taken exception to by reviewers. Three years later Asmus attempted to extend his proof to the *Misopogon*.³⁸ He assumed that this treatise also is based almost entirely upon the same commentary of Iamblichus. Although the reference to Democritus escaped Asmus' attention, in spite of the appearance of an Ionic form strange in the text of an author who endeavors not to depart from the norm of Attic and Atticistic language, Asmus drew from the same passage an important conclusion,³⁹ which will enable us to go farther.

In that passage Julian says that it is a hard task to learn better ways and that it is more difficult to change one's points of view when one is approaching old age. According to Asmus, these words have a special point, inasmuch as they contain a hidden reference to the philosopher Dionysius whose nickname was *ὁ Μεταθέμενος*.⁴⁰ This assumption is, however, nothing but a mere hypothesis. Nevertheless, Asmus takes it for granted, without any definite proof, that Iamblichus in his (hypothetical) commentary on *Alcibiades I*

³⁶ Rudolf Asmus, "Der Alkibiades-Kommentar des Iamblichos als Hauptquelle für Kaiser Julian," *SHAW* 1917, 3. Abhandl.

³⁷ It is important for the whole problem with which we are dealing that the second title of the dialogue *Alcibiades I* is *περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως*, cf. Proclus in the commentary on *Alc. I*, p. 12 Creuzer: *εἰσὶ δ' οὕτινες κατὰ τὸ λεκτικὸν αὐτοῦ ποιοῦμενοι τὴν τομὴν εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ . . . καὶ μαιεῖαν αὐτὸν διηγήκασιν, ἐπαίνου μὲν δεῖσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον λέγοντες, ἔν'. . . μαιείας δέ, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸν ἐκκαλέσθαι πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως καὶ τῆς προεπούσης ἐπιμελείας τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει.* It is quite a different matter and does not affect our discussion, that the additional titles of the Platonic dialogues do not go back to Plato, cf. Ernst Nachmanson, "Der griechische Buchtitel," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift* 47 (1941), 19, p. 10ff.

³⁸ Rudolf Asmus, "Kaiser Julians *Misopogon* und seine Quelle," *Ph* 76 (1920), 266ff. and 77 (1921), 109ff.

³⁹ *Ph* 77 (1921), 138.

⁴⁰ Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.4, 166ff.

illustrated the so-called ἀποστασία of Alcibiades ⁴¹ by the instance of this philosopher, who, according to Diogenes Laertius 7.4.167, wrote, in addition to many other works, a treatise Περὶ ἀσκήσεως ⁴² in two books. The only thing we really know is that one of the favorite topics of Neo-Platonic circles was to discuss the problem of μεταβολή at length (Proclus p. 300 Creuzer ⁴³ on *Alc. I* 113e; cf. Olympiod. p. 220 Creuzer ⁴⁴ on *Alc. I* 131d). Now, Julian asserts that he is unwilling and unable to undergo any μεταβολή, although in so doing he might please the people of Antioch, whose aims are ἡδονή and τρυφή and nothing else,—at least in the opinion of the emperor. The Cynic philosopher Menippus is known to have directed a heavy attack against Dionysius ὁ Μεταθέμενος in one of his satires. This attack left some traces in Lucian's Δις κατηγορούμενος. It is hard to decide whether Julian, in his treatises and orations, used Menippus directly ⁴⁵ or at second hand through Lucian; and in our special case the answering of that question is not particularly relevant. The reference to Dionysius ὁ Μεταθέμενος is very doubtful, and the possible reference to Menippus cannot be claimed for the hypothetical commentary of Iamblichus. Nevertheless, Julian's discussions (in *Or.* 6.241.5ff. H. and 7.272.25ff. H.) are of great importance also for the special problem of the quota-

⁴¹ See Proclus 86 Creuzer on *Alc. I* 103b: μήποτε οὖν τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφώντος (*Αφρονη*. 1.2, 18; 24; 25) ἀληθές, ὡς ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτης (-ει?) συνῆν, οὐδενὸς οὐδενὶ κακῶν (v. l. κακοῦ) γέγονεν αἴτιος, ἀποστὰς δὲ τῆς τοῦ Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας ὑπὸ τε πλούτου καὶ τρυφῆς διεφθάρη καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο τηλικαῦτα ἐξήμαρτεν. Julian emphasizes again and again that the whole life of the people of Antioch centers on τρυφή, while he is very far from imitating them. The motive of ἀποστασία is referred to by Olympiodorus p. 220 Creuzer on *Alc. I* 131d. The difference, however, is that Olympiodorus introduces Socrates as saying: εἰ βούλει μὴ ἀποστήναι, ἔσο κάλλιστος.

⁴² I have mentioned this treatise particularly because the problem of ἀσκησις proved to be important (see p. 219f.) for the identification of the fragment of Democritus, cf. also p. 228f.

⁴³ τὸ δὲ "οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς" ἀφίστησιν αὐτὸν τῆς νεοπροπρεποῦς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς υπερφρονοῦσης μὲν τῶν ἐστώτων λόγων, τὰ δὲ καινὰ καὶ νέα ζητούσης δόγματα. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πεποιθήσιν δοσι τῆς γενέσεως εἰσιν ἀναπεπλησμένοι τῆς ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἐχούσης, καὶ ὁ σοὶ χαίρουσι ταῖς μετὰ βολαῖς τῆς ἐστώσης φύσεως οὐδαμῶς ἀντιλαμβάνομενοι. καθάπαξ γὰρ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τούτων ἀναμάττονται οἷς συνάπτουσιν αὐτάς, καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὖν ὁμοιοῦμεναι τοῦ ταυτοῦ καὶ ἀμεταβλήτου καὶ κατὰ τὰ δόγματα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζῶν ἀντέχοντα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν γένεσιν προσκολλώμεναι τὸ καινὸν αἰεὶ καὶ νεοπροπρεπὲς ἐπιδιώκουσι καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐπ' ἄλλα φέρονται δοξάσματα καὶ τῶν ἐστώτων (the text is uncertain, αἰσθητῶν εἰς in the text, ἐστώτων as correction in a note Creuzer) λόγων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνεπαίσθητοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. Immediately afterwards Proclus says that the μεταβολή προσήκει only τοῖς ἀψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἑτεροκινήτοις but not τοῖς αὐτοκινήτοις καὶ αὐτονεργήτοις λόγου τῆς ψυχῆς.

⁴⁴ I have quoted this passage in note 41.

⁴⁵ This view is held for the *Caesares* by Geffcken, *l.c.* 149 and 156.

tions from Democritus in Julian's *Misopogon*. He refers to some Cynic tragedies, which "now are said to be the works of a certain Philiscus of Aegina," although there was a time when they were attributed to *Diogenes*. The decision concerning their authorship is quite irrelevant in Julian's opinion, "though even if they were by Diogenes, there would be nothing out of the way in a wise man's jesting, since many philosophers have been known to do so."⁴⁶ However, instead of giving the names of those "many philosophers," Julian contents himself with referring to only one, namely, *Democritus*, and goes on: "for Democritus also, we are told, used to laugh when he saw men taking themselves seriously." Is it only coincidental that Diogenes and Democritus⁴⁷ are connected in this way, or must we lay open more hidden and more important relations between them, and of what kind is the link which connects them in the opinion of Julian? The answer to this question is given by Julian himself.

On page 219f. of this paper I have dealt with those fragments of Democritus in which he states that *ἄσκησις* is much more important than *φύσις*, and that *ἔθος* which is based upon *ἄσκησις* (or *μελέτη*) develops into second nature. In *Oration* 6.194D (252.15ff. H.) Julian says that Diogenes τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοῖς πόνοις ἀνέδην παρείχεν, ἵνα αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ῥωμαλέωτερον καταστήσῃ. Diogenes, who endeavors to strengthen and correct his nature by undergoing continuous and intense toils, acts in full harmony with Democritus, who tells us in fragment 241 D.-K. (132 N.) that πόνος συνεχῆς ἐλαφρότερος ἑαυτοῦ συνεχθείη γίνεται, and in fragment 242 D.-K. (193 N.) that more people become ἀγαθοί by *ἄσκησις* than by nature. Julian goes on (195 A [252.21f. H.]): ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως ὁ ἀνὴρ οὕτω μὲν ἔσχευεν ἀνδρεῖον τὸ σῶμα ὥς . . ., which means that because of this *ἄσκησις* Diogenes developed⁴⁸ his first nature into a second one which proved to be superior. In *Oration* 7.223C (289.18 H.) Julian asks the pretended Cynic Heraclius, whom he criticizes indignantly, this question: τίνα δὲ ἄσκησιν ἐποιήσω τοῦ βίου; immedia-

⁴⁶ I have followed the translation of Wilmer Cave Wright, the editor of Julian in the Loeb Classical Library.

⁴⁷ If this proves true, it will not be easy to resist the temptation to explain the foolish characterization of Democritus as "the laughing philosopher," the origin of which we do not know, as a Cynic invention, which echoes, however, more serious and more profound relations between Democritus and the Cynics. It is perhaps not without significance that the first to refer to this invention is Horace, *Epist.* 2.1.194.

⁴⁸ The aorist *ἔσχευεν* has its full force.

tely after he refers to Diogenes. He then goes on to deny that, without that *ἀσκησις*, he is entitled to be called a genuine Cynic in the sense of Diogenes.

Diogenes' characterization as given by Julian receives its full confirmation from three testimonia offered by Diogenes Laertius. The first (6.71) reads as follows: οὐδέν γε μὴν ἔλεγε (sc. Diogenes) τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι. This has only restricted value for us, inasmuch as it offers a parallel to Julian's words. The second and third, however, furnish new reasons for believing that Democritus was linked with the Cynics in Neo-Platonic circles. In Diogenes Laertius 6.71 Diogenes is supposed to say: δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἐλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, παρὰ τὴν ἀνοίαν κακοδαιμονοῦσι. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἢ καταφρόνησις ἡδυτάτη προμελετηθεῖσα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ συνεθισθέντες ἡδέως ζῆν ἀηδῶς ἐπὶ τούναντιον μετίσιν, οὕτως οἱ τούναντιον ἀσκηθέντες ἡδίων αὐτῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν καταφρονοῦσι. In view of a sentence like this it is easy to understand that philosophers of later antiquity who wished to demonstrate some influence of Democritus upon the Cynics found the best possible link in the pretended hedonism of Democritus. Although the original early Cynic writing is almost entirely lost, we are still in position to follow up this tendency of ancient historians of philosophy and writers of commentaries. For this purpose we must compare with the sentence of Diogenes which I have just quoted the passage of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* A 10.1369b 16f. where he says: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν, and we must remember⁴⁹ that these words of Aristotle seem to echo a tenet of—Democritus! Under these circumstances it is not surprising that both passages show the same peculiarity of style, seeing that they express the same thought as pointedly and as paradoxically as possible.

Also the third reference to the earliest Cynics in Diogenes Laertius which we have to take into consideration, carries us not only back to Democritus but also forward to Julian again. In 6.7 he quotes Antisthenes as saying: ἐρωτηθεῖς, τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαϊότατον, ἔφη "τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν." Let us remember that Julian refuses to give up those of his habits which are bad only in the opinion of the effeminate people of Antioch but which are very far from being bad in his own opinion and are actually of funda-

⁴⁹ See p. 221.

mental importance for the whole of his life. There is a curious variant reading in the text of Diogenes Laertius which must be seriously taken into consideration. Instead of *ἔφη τὰ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν* we read in several mss. *τὸ περὶ αἰρεῖν*, *ἔφη*, *τὸ ἀπομαρθάνειν*. This variant is so out of the ordinary that it cannot be easily rejected. R. D. Hicks, the editor of Diogenes Laertius in the Loeb Classical Library, translates these words by "how to get rid of having anything to unlearn," and H. Ritter-L. Preller-Ed. Wellmann, *Hist. Philos. Graec.*⁹ (Gotha, 1913) 220, no. 283, note 1, give the following Latin interpretation, "hoc agere ne dediscas quae didiceris." When I discussed the identical feeling of Julian⁵⁰ and put it into relation with Democritus, it became evident that the ideas of *μεταβολή* and *μετατίθεσθαι* have a pre-eminent role in Neo-Platonic thought. Even if we leave undecided the question whether or not that variant reading should be accepted, the alternative does not affect the link which connects Democritus with the Cynics and with Julian, who eventually was influenced by some Neo-Platonists.

If there is any need of further proof that we are right in assuming that Julian became familiar with the ethical doctrine of Democritus as well as with the Cynic philosophy through Neo-Platonists we must cast a glance at Julian's sixth oration *Εἰς τοὺς ἀπαιδευτοὺς κύνας*, 193Dff. (251.3ff. H.). Here he discusses the aim of Cynic philosophy, upon the realization of which the happiness of Diogenes is based. R. Asmus, *SHAW* 1917.3.39f., has pointed out that this part of the oration also echoes Neo-Platonic ideas, inasmuch as it combines ethical tenets of Cynic and Socratic-Platonic philosophy. It is, however, a different question whether or not these Neo-Platonic ideas are supposed to go back to Iamblichus. Julian asserts (193D) that⁵¹ "the end and aim of the Cynic philosophy, as indeed of every philosophy, is happiness, but happiness that consists in living according to nature and not according to the opinion of the multitude. (194A) And so too in the case of human beings we must not be busy about happiness as if it were hidden away outside ourselves." . . . (194C) If nature had given us bodies and souls like other animals, it might be sufficient for us to rest content with external advantages and bodily pleasures. Nature, however, implanted in us a soul which is by no means similar to the souls of the other animals. . . . The expression used by Julian,

⁵⁰ See above pp. 217; 223; 226.

⁵¹ Cf. page 228, note 46.

ψυχὴ ἔσπαρται, resembles strikingly the term ἦθος ἐνετράφη which is used in the *Misopogon*. It has appeared that these words ἦθος ἐνετράφη cannot be separated from the quotations from Democritus. The ἦθος which was implanted in Julian by his teacher became the basis of his entire existence, he adhered to it, and it developed into a second nature and became ἔθος. As a human being begins to have real life with aims which are worth living for only after a deity has implanted a soul in it (*Or.* 6), so real life began for Julian only after his teacher implanted in him the ἦθος the outcome of which is his second nature (*Misopogon*), which is at least of equal, and perhaps of greater, value than his first nature. This he indicates by Democritus' words φύσει μάχεσθαι ἔργον, without adding ταύτῃ or ταύτῃ τῇ δευτέρῃ. In the sixth oration Julian draws Cynic and Stoic consequences (φύσει ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν) which go far beyond the principles of Democritean ethics. However, as they were easily derived from them, this connection was the decisive motive for quoting two sentences of Democritus in just that section of the *Misopogon* which contains fundamental confessions of the emperor. The spirit of these sentences, which are far from being merely an external ornament of style, was essential to his whole mode of life.